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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
thoroughness of appeals court conferences. 47 Nonetheless,
when article V, § 8(B) is applicable, the favored position ac-
corded lower court findings of fact by the Constitution of 1974
should guide the courts of appeal in their review of trial court
determinations. Ideally, increased judicial sensitivity to the
need for delicately balancing first-hand trial court findings of
fact with the economics and equity of appellate review of fact
will be the product of mandatory appellate reargument.
Joseph S. Palermo, Jr.
DUE PROCESS FOR DRIVERS UNDER THE LOUISIANA
REVOCATION STATUTES
With the recent demise of the right-privilege distinction
in procedural due process analysis,' the United States Su-
preme Court is declaring state statutory schemes invalid
under the fourteenth amendment with increasing frequency. 2
The parameters of liberty and property interests and the
procedures required of the state to protect them are ex-
panding to match increasing governmental power. The pur-
pose of this note is to determine whether the Louisiana
scheme for revocation and suspension of drivers' licenses has
kept apace with these constitutional developments. 3
interval (in about 30 of approximately 800 cases) was there a reversal or
modification of a lower court's findings coupled with a dissent from the
reversal or modification.
47. This rationale was suggested by Judge Landry in a conversation the
writer had with the senior judge of the First Circuit Court of Appeal on
December 18, 1975.
1. E.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972) ("[T]he Court
has fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between 'rights' and
'privileges' that once seemed to govern the applicability of procedural due
process rights."); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 374 (1971). Formerly, many states labeled statu-
torily permitted activities as "privileges" on the theory that what the state
gives it may take away without due process.
2. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (Ohio high school student
suspension statute).
3. Only LA. R.S. 32:414 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1974, No. 508 § 1,
and LA. R.S. 32:661-69 (Supp. 1972), as amended [hereinafter cited as the
Implied Consent Law], will be considered in this note. Other statutes provid-
ing for revocation or suspension, such as LA. R.S. 32:415 (1950) (commission of
an offense in another jurisdiction which would be grounds for revocation or
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Every state has a compelling interest in preventing use
of its highways by dangerous drivers. Although summary
revocation of the licenses of all such drivers might be con-
stitutionally permissible, 4 the applicable Louisiana statutes
do not extend so far. The Louisiana Implied Consent Law5
does not penalize one for driving while intoxicated but rather
for his refusal to submit to a chemical sobriety test. One who
refuses to submit incurs a six-month suspension of his license,
whereas one who submits and proves himself a menace, albeit
a complacent one, keeps his license pending trial. The other
major Louisiana statute dealing with revocation of drivers'
licenses, La. R.S. 32:414, mandates suspension or revocation,
with few exceptions,6 only after the licensee has been con-
victed of enumerated offenses. 7 Thus the legislation allows
significant lengths of time to lapse between apprehension
and suspension even in the cases of those drivers most likely
to be a hazard to the public safety.
suspension if committed in this state), LA. R.S. 32:423 (1950) (violation of
license restriction), LA. R.S. 32:424 (1950) (incompetence or failure to submit
to competency examination), LA. R.S. 32:475 (Supp. 1972) (abandonment of
automobile), LA. R.S. 32:872 (Supp. 1962) (failure to deposit security after
uninsured accident), LA. R.S. 32:892 (Supp. 1962) (failure to pay judgment),
LA. R.S. 32:1023 (Supp. 1962) (failure to report accident), LA. R.S. 32:1441
(Supp. 1972) (breach of promise to comply with another state's traffic cita-
tion), and LA. R.S. 32:1477 (Supp. 1972) (habitual offender), are very narrow
in scope, and most make no mention of procedure, apparently relying upon
section 414. "Revocation" and "suspension" will hereinafter be used inter-
changeably, as the difference is of no consequence to the topic covered in this
note. See LA. R.S. 32:401(8), (9) (1950) (revocation requires the licensee to
apply for a new license, whereas after suspension the old license is returned,
if unexpired).
4. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 n.10 (1970).
5. LA. R.S. 32:661-69 (Supp. 1972), as amended.
6. LA. R.S. 32:414(C) (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1968, No. 597 § 1,
mandates revocation upon receipt by the Department of Public Safety of
satisfactory evidence of a "violation" of LA. R.S. 32:414.1 (Supp. 1972) (unlaw-
ful use of license); subsection (E) grants discretion to the Department to
revoke licenses based upon enumerated findings primarily related to the
licensee's record of past driving offenses or competence to drive, but does not
require a conviction.
7. LA. R.S. 32:414 lists conviction, the entry of a plea of guilty and
sentence thereupon or the forfeiture of bail, on charges of: driving while
intoxicated (on the first offense the judge may prevent suspension); man-
slaughter or negligent homicide resulting from use of a motor vehicle; any
felony, if a motor vehicle is used in the commission thereof; failure to stop
and render aid after an accident; or three charges of reckless driving within
twelve months.
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In addition to the state interests involved, the Louisiana
statutes affect significant individual interests. Whether it be
deemed right or privilege, liberty or property, the use of the
automobile is indispensable to our lifestyle and often to our
livelihoods." The licensee thus has an undeniable interest in
seeing that his freedom to operate a motor vehicle is not
unfairly circumscribed.
The proper accomodation of the conflicting state and in-
dividual interests present in the operation of the statutes
under consideration must be reached through the language of
the United States Constitution. The threshold determination
in any due process claim is the existence vel non of a liberty
or property interest; 9 a finding of either places the individual
within the protection of the fourteenth amendment. 10 While
the right to drive an automobile on public highways is not
grounded in the Constitution, as a statutory entitlement" it
falls within the ambit of liberty as well as property.12 In Bell
v. Burson 3 the United States Supreme Court, confronted
with a due process attack upon a drivers' license revocation
statute,'14 stated:
[I]t is fundamental that except in emergency situations
. . . due process requires that when a State seeks to
8. See, e.g., Wignall v. Fletcher, 303 N.Y. 435, 103 N.E.2d 728 (1952);
Johnston, The Administrative Hearing for the Suspension of a Driver's
License, 30 N.C. L. REv. 27 (1951).
9. E.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599 (1972); Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). Property and liberty are not mutually exclu-
sive. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 572-76 (1975) (temporary suspension
of public high school students involves both liberty and property rights).
10. The importance of the interest goes only to the form of process due;
the nature of the interest alone determines applicability. E.g., Board of Re-
gents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972).
11. "[A] person's liberty is equally protected, even when the liberty itself
is a statutory creation of the state." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558
(1974).
12. "Liberty under law extends to the full range of conduct which the
individual is free to pursue." Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
Because a driver has a statutory right to the license if he is eligible, and by
statute it cannot be revoked without sufficient cause, it is a property interest
regardless of the absence of hardship. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 577-78 (1972).
13. 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
14. The licensee attacked Georgia's financial responsibility statute on the
grounds that, though it required only the posting of security by those in-
volved in accidents, it did not allow them an opportunity to controvert the
possibility of liability in the pre-suspension hearing. 402 U.S. at 537-39.
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terminate an interest such as that here involved, it must
afford "notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to
the nature of the case" before the termination becomes
effective. 15
Although the Supreme Court established in Bell that an
individual's right to drive is protected by the fourteenth
amendment, it did note that the state may act without a prior
hearing in emergency situations.16 Though invariably denom-
inated an exception, logically the emergency doctrine is not
an exception to the individual's right to due process, but
rather is a reflection of the balancing approach employed by
the Supreme Court. 17
Expeditious removal of dangerous drivers from the public
highways is exactly the type of state interest contemplated
by the emergency doctrine.' It is not, however, the objective
implemented by the Louisiana statutes providing for revo-
cation of licenses. The Implied Consent Law justifies emer-
gency action only if one makes the unfounded assumption
that refusal equals drunkenness, 19 and even if one makes this
assumption, the "emergency" is no greater than when the
driver submits to the test and fails,20 in which case he may
15. 402 U.S. at 542-43. The facts of Bell were such that the license was
essential to the licensee's livelihood, 402 U.S. at 537, but neither the Court's
opinion nor the jurisprudence in its wake suggests that the holding would be
any different in the absence of hardship. E.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67,
88-89 (1972); Smith v. Department of Public Safety, 254 So. 2d 515 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1971).
16. 402 U.S. at 542. See quote in text at note 15, supra. The emergency
exception accompanies nearly every procedural due process decision. See, e.g.,
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254, 263 n.10 (1970) (list of emergencies).
17. E.g., Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950). But see Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process:
Toward Limits on the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1510 (1975).
Due process lies in the balance between a state's interest in summary process
and the harm which would thereby befall an individual deprived of a prior
hearing.
18. For a discussion of the emergency doctrine in the context of drivers'
license revocation, see Note, 52 NEB. L. REV. 412 (1973).
19. Holland v. Parker, 354 F. Supp. 196, 202 (D. S.D. 1973). Contra,
Campbell v. Superior Ct., 106 Ariz. 542 (1971) (high degree of correlation
between refusal and intoxication lessens individual interest and allows state
to suspend prior to hearing).
20. Holland v. Parker, 354 F. Supp. 196, 202 (D. S.D. 1973): "If there is
time to permit prerevocation adjudication for the driver found presumptively
under the influence of alcohol, then there is no reason why the same oppor-
tunity should not be afforded the driver who refuses the test."
1976]
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keep his license pending trial. That the statute delays the
commencement of the suspension until the license is surren-
dered2 1 further dilutes any claim of exigency. 22 La. R.S. 32:414
is subject to similar attack in that the state's interest in
summary action is not suddenly greater by reason of a con-
viction.
The Supreme Court in Bell determined that a "mean-
ingful" and "appropriate" hearing must precede effective
suspension but provided no further guidelines. Nevertheless,
under the balance generally struck by the Court, the greater
the extent of agency discretion, 23 the greater the risk of er-
ror, 24 including the degree of adjudicative fact in dispute,25
and the more severe the attending deprivation, 26 the more
stringent are the procedural requirements imposed upon the
state.
The major provisions of La. R.S. 32:414 rely solely upon
the fact of prior convictions 27 with no discretion accorded to
the Department of Public Safety as to treatment of individual
licenses. Only the identity of the licensee and whether the
conviction is of an offense listed in section 414 are normally
subject to dispute.2 8 Although some authority exists for the
21. LA. R.S. 32:667 (Supp. 1968), as amended by La. Acts 1972, No. 534 § 1.
22. Moreover, the public will be protected from the driver for only six
months whether the suspension begins immediately upon refusal or after
opportunity for a hearing. Comment, Oklahoma's Implied Consent Statute-Is
Due Process Due?, 10 TULSA L.J. 398, 408 (1975). Though the courts deny that
the sole purpose of the suspension is to aid criminal prosecution, Harrison v.
Department of Public Safety, 298 So. 2d 312, 318 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974), it is
at least one objective of the statute.
23. See cases cited in note 26, infra.
24. Besides disputed facts, risk of error includes the quality of the evi-
dence and the fallibility of the sources relied upon. See, e.g., Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565, 580 (1975).
25. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.03 (1958) [hereinafter
cited as DAVIS]. Adjudicative facts are those pertaining to a party, those
which he is best suited to know, as opposed to legislative facts, which are the
general, societal facts underlying the legislation.
26. E.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 580, 584 (1975); Arnett v. Kennedy,
416 U.S. 134, 201 (1974) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Commonwealth v. Thomas, 467 S.W.2d 335, 337 (Ky. 1971) (holding un-
constitutional. a statute very similar to LA. R.S. 32:414(D) (1950), as amended
by La. Acts 1974, No. 508 § 1); Stauffer v. Weedlun, 188 Neb. 105, 114, 195
N.W.2d 218, 224 (1972) (upholding point-system of revocation without prior
hearing because little risk of error and no discretion).
27. See discussion in note 7, supra.
28. The validity of the conviction may be challenged, but an uncounseled
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position that no prior hearing is required in these circum-
stances,29 the better view, which has found some acceptance
in Louisiana,30 is that an "identification" hearing is required
before revocation.
The Implied Consent Law is likewise devoid of depart-
mental discretion. Nevertheless, it involves a substantial risk
of error. Because no prior judicial disposition of the circum-
stances surrounding the licensee's refusal is made, a consid-
erable area of adjudicative fact is subject to dispute at the
initial hearing.31 The provisions of section 414 not based upon
prior convictions also operate on the basis of disputable facts:
Departmental findings of criminal activity 32 and even the De-
partment's opinion that the licensee is "incompetent to drive"
or displays "disrespect for traffic laws" are grounds for revo-
cation. 33 The licensee prosecuted under the Implied Consent
Law or under these latter provisions of section 414 requires
greater procedural protection than one who has been ad-
judged guilty in a court proceeding. Timely notice, sufficiently
detailed to communicate the events to be relied upon for
suspension, must be furnished the licensee by the Depart-
ment;34 he must be allowed to confront and cross-examine the
witnesses against him and present a defense by oral argu-
ment and evidence; 35 counsel need not be provided but must
be permitted;3 6 and finally, an impartial hearing officer must
prepare an informal record of the evidence and an informal
conviction not resulting in imprisonment may be relied upon for revocation of
defendant's driver's license. Marston v. Oliver, 485 F.2d 705 (4th Cir. 1973);
State v. Guillotte, 297 So. 2d 423, 425 (La. 1974) (dictum).
29 DAVIS at 502.
30. Smith v. Department of Public Safety, 254 So. 2d 515 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1971).
31. See, e.g., Swan v. Department of Public Safety, 311 So. 2d 498 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1975) (police led licensee to believe he had absolute right to
refuse); Kolb v. Department of Public Safety, 299 So. 2d 877 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1974) (police failed to inform licensee of consequences of refusal).
32. LA. R.S. 32:414(C) (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1968, No. 597 § 1
(revocation upon receipt of satisfactory evidence of a "violation" of LA. R.S.
32:414.1 (Supp. 1972), constituting unlawful use of license).
33. LA. R.S. 32:414(D) (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1974, No. 508 § 1.
34. E.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970).
35. Id.
36. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970). Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407 U.S. 25 (1972), held that counsel is required in any prosecution that
results in "loss of liberty"; however, the opinion made clear that the phrase
was used loosely as synonymous with "imprisonment."
1976]
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opinion containing findings of fact and conclusions of law
based solely on that record. 37 Louisiana is free to afford the
individual greater protection, but before it may suspend his
license under the present statutes these minimum require-
ments must be satisfied.
Since the Implied Consent Law furnishes a licensee with
the right to written notice, opportunity for an administrative
hearing and judicial review "in the same manner and under
the same conditions as is provided in La. R.S. 32:414,' ' 3 8 what-
ever administrative or judicial review of a suspension order is
statutorily available will be found in section 414. That section,
however, provides only for a post-suspension hearing before
the district court,39 and although it does provide that the
Department may conduct an "investigation" prior to revoca-
tion, the statute does not indicate that the licensee even need
be made a party.40
The Louisiana courts of appeal have held consistently
that section 414 (and thus the Implied Consent Law) comports
with due process; 4 1 relying upon the opportunity for judicial
review provided in section 414(E), the courts have found the
necessary hearing prior to effective suspension, as required
by the Supreme Court in Bell v. Burson.42 However, the stat-
37. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254 (1970). See generally Meyerhoff & Mishkin, Application of Goldberg v.
Kelly Hearing Requirements to Termination of Social Security Beneits, 26
STAN. L. REV. 549 (1974).
38. LA. R.S. 32:668 (Supp. 1968), as amended by La. Acts 1972, No. 534 § 1.
39. The statutory language clearly does not contemplate a prior hearing.
"Any person denied a license or whose license has been suspended, cancelled
or revoked shall have the right to file an application within thirty days
thereafter for a hearing before the district court ... ." LA. R.S. 32:414(E)
(1950), as amended by La. Acts 1968, No. 597 § 1 (emphasis added).
40. Contra, Areaux v. Department of Public Safety, 297 So. 2d 684 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1974) ["investigation" in LA. R.S. 32:414 (1950), must be the
hearing referred to in LA. R.S. 32:668 (Supp. 1972)].
41. E.g., Spencer v. Department of Public Safety, 315 So. 2d 912 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1975); Whitaker v. State, 264 So. 2d 725 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972), writ
vacated, 278 So. 2d 503 (La. 1973); Smith v. Department of Public Safety, 254
So. 2d 515 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971). The Louisiana Supreme Court has never
considered the matter, denying writs consistently.
42. 402 U.S. 535 (1971). But see Green v. Department of Public Safety, 308
So. 2d 863 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975) (mandatory language in LA. R.S. 32:668
(Supp. 1972), requires administrative hearing; trial de novo will not suffice);




ute nowhere indicates that a petition for judicial review post-
pones suspension. In Harrison v. Department of Public
Safety 43 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal reasoned that
since the six-month period of suspension under the Implied
Consent Law begins only upon surrender of the license, an
opportunity for prior review is afforded. The court overlooked
the fact that section 414 allows but five days for surrender of
the license, on pain of imprisonment,4 4 while requiring ten
days notice to the Department before the judicial hearing can
be held. The licensee must therefore surrender the license at
least five days before the hearing or violate the law; the
license is thus effectively suspended before the hearing.
Harrison and its progeny 4 5 are the only cases that at-
tempt to find compliance with procedural due process in the
language of the statute; the remainder of the jurisprudence
either omits this step entirely 46 or defers to the presumption
of constitutionality. 47 Such a presumption must be based
upon a reasonable interpretation of the statute,48 which is
made impossible by both the language and the legislative
intent implicit in section 414. 49 Thus, if La. R.S. 32:414 and the
Implied Consent Law are to survive the mandates of Bell,
they will have to be remedied by legislative amendment.50
43. 298 So. 2d 312 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 300 So. 2d 840 (La.
1974).
44. LA. R.S. 32:427 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1954, No. 165 § 10. The
imprisonment sanction has never been raised on the appellate level in the
context of a later surrender.
45. Spencer v. Department of Public Safety, 315 So. 2d 912 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1975); Green v. Department of Public Safety, 308 So. 2d 863 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1975); Vicknair v. Department of Public Safety, 303 So. 2d 226 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1974).
46. See David v. Department of Public Safety, 261 So. 2d 347 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1972); Smith v. Department of Public Safety, 254 So. 2d 515 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1971).
47. See Whitaker v. Department of Public Safety, 264 So. 2d 725 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1972), writ vacated, 278 So. 2d 503 (La. 1973).
48. Pearce v. Sharbino, 254 La. 143, 223 So. 2d 126 (1969).
49. At the time of its enactment, La. Acts 1946, No. 255 § 16, a prior
hearing was deemed unnecessary. See Longlois v. Department of Public
Safety, 90 So. 2d 595 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1956); Parker v. Board of Barber
Examiners, 84 So. 2d 80 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1955). Indeed, this position was
reaffirmed in 1973 LA. Op. ATT'Y GEN. (Oct. 30, 1973) (unpublished, but on file
in the office of the Louisiana Law Review).
50. See State v. Snyder, 277 So. 2d 660, 668 (La. 1973) (unconstitutional
statute should be corrected by the legislature).
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Arguably, the Louisiana legislature has provided just
such an amendment in its enactment of the Louisiana Ad-
minstrative Procedure Act (APA).51 The Act governs non-
revenue licensing "when the grant, denial, or renewal of a
license is required by constitution or statute to be preceded
by notice and opportunity for hearing," 52 allowing the Louisi-
ana APA to expand its coverage to remedy acts like section
414 when they are constitutionally deficient.53 Moreover, the
Act seeks uniformity of agency process, 54 and "any exception
... to its applicability would tend to defeat this purpose." 55
Section 414 conflicts with the Act only over provision for prior
notice and opportunity to be heard; as these are the very
deficiencies sought to be remedied, they should not be relied
upon to defeat application of the APA.5 6
The section of the Louisiana APA devoted to licenses, La.
R.S. 49:961, apparently was designed to apply only to oc-
cupational and commerical non-revenue licensing. Neverthe-
less, subsumption of drivers' licenses under this general pro-
vision would effect the necessary changes in revocation pro-
51. LA. R.S. 49:951-67 (Supp. 1972), as amended.
52. LA. R.S. 49:951(3) (Supp. 1972) (emphasis added). Even if "denial" is
construed so narrowly as not to include revocation, the broad definition of
"order" in the same subsection does cover it: "the whole or any part of the
final disposition (whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in
form) of any agency, in any matter other than rule-making, required by
constitution or statute to be determined on the record after notice and oppor-
tunity for an agency hearing .... .
53. See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
54. See Foreward, Proposed Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act.
55. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41 (1950). This decision is
highly persuasive authority in Louisiana because of the lack of state juris-
prudence interpreting the statute, and the origin of the Louisiana provision
in the federal law. Cf. Kay v. Carter, 243 La. 1095, 1102, 150 So. 2d 27, 29
(1963); Roy & Roy v. Riddle, 187 So. 2d 492, 494 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1966). The
statutory enumeration of exemptions from the APA has been judicially ex-
panded only when the APA and the agency's governing statute are "so
conflicting as to be irreconcilable." Smith v. Dunn, 263 La. 599, 602, 268 So. 2d
670, 671 (1972).
56. But see 1973 LA. OP. ATT'Y GEN. (Oct. 30, 1973), supra, note 49. Young
v. State, 298 So. 2d 298 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974), held the Louisiana Adminis-
trative Procedure Act applicable to the Department of Public Safety because
it was not a listed exception. State v. Moore distinguished Young and held the
La. APA inapplicable, 311 So. 2d 20 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975). Both Moore and
the Attorney General rely on the lack of a requirement of prior administra-




cedure without producing any undesirable results. Section
961 continues all licenses in force pending final disposition of
a renewal application timely filed. As this provision does not
preclude revocation for cause, and the state's interest in re-
newal of drivers' licenses is primarily fiscal, 57 its application
will cause no disruption in the state's protection of the public.
Absent an express finding that the public welfare imper-
atively requires summary suspension, section 961 requires
notice and opportunity for a hearing "prior to the institution
of agency proceedings" for revocation. Finally, section 961
provides that the sections of the APA on adjudication, La.
R.S. 49:955-64, shall govern this hearing. These sections set
forth hearing procedures substantially the same as those de-
veloped by the courts under the rubric of due process. They
provide the licensee with the powers of deposition and sub-
poena,58 and with a less stringent rule of evidence, while
preserving intact the rules of privilege. 59 Furthermore, they
give the licensee the right to judicial"° and appellate 6' review.
If the courts will not recognize the applicability of the Louisi-
ana APA to the revocation and suspension of drivers'
licenses, they should invalidate the present revocation stat-
utes and thereby require the legislature to provide the licen-
see the procedural protection that the Constitution demands.
Roy S. Payne
57. See LA. R.S. 32:412(D) (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1973, No. 138 §
1: "Every license shall be renewable.., upon application and payment of the
fee .... The testing of renewal applicants is minimal, especially with regard
to its impact upon safety.
58. LA. R.S. 49:956 (Supp. 1972).
59. Id.
60. LA. R.S. 49:964 (Supp. 1972).
61. LA. R.S. 49:965 (Supp. 1972).
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